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In contrast to other countries across Europe which saw the emergence of Eurosceptic and far-right parties
during the European Parliament elections, the story in Spain was the breakthrough of the left-wing
‘Podemos’ (‘We can’), who secured eight per cent of the country’s vote despite only being formed
shortly before the election. Paul Kennedy writes on the party’s development and the impact it could
have on the Spanish party system ahead of the 2015 Spanish general election. He notes that
Podemos, which is closely linked to the ’15-M’ protest movement that began in 2011, has the
potential to win votes from those who have traditionally supported the main centre-left Spanish
Socialist Workers’ Party. One of the key decisions affecting its success, however, is likely to be
whether it chooses to align with other smaller parties in Spain, such as those in the ‘Plural Left’ coalition.
Podemos (We can) was responsible for causing the greatest upset at Spain’s European Parliamentary elections: it
established itself as Spain’s fourth most popular party, having obtained eight per cent of the vote and five seats.
Established just two months before the elections, and still without formal organisational bodies or card-carrying
members, Podemos essentially emerged during the actual election campaign, although the party/social movement
is inextricably linked with the 15-M protest movement which began in May 2011 in response to the effects of an
economic crisis which has left one-in-four Spaniards (and over half of under-25s) without a job.
Those supporting Podemos are organised into some
four hundred ‘circles’ or work groups scattered
throughout neighbourhoods and towns throughout
Spain, with thousands of sympathisers submitting policy
suggestions which were included in the party’s 36-page
programme. More of a wish list than a fully-costed
manifesto, many voters nevertheless liked what they
saw.
Claiming that the existing political establishment has
failed in its fundamental duty of genuinely representing
the electorate, Podemos is now firmly viewed as the
embodiment of the 15-M movement’s attempts to
secure political representation in existing political
institutions so as to challenge a political and economic
status quo based on the acceptance of EU-imposed
austerity policies. Podemos attracted support from left-
of-centre voters who have lost faith in the capacity of the
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party  (PSOE), which
presided over the intensification of the downturn
between 2008 and 2011, to address the crisis and have resisted the rival charms of the Izquierda Plural (Plural Left)
coalition comprising the Communist-dominated Izquierda Unida (IU – United Left) and Greens.
Throughout the campaign, there was a significant personalisation around the figure of Pablo Iglesias, a 35-year-old
politics lecturer who was presented as the face of Podemos to the extent of his image appearing on voting slips. The
son of Socialist parents, the former Communist Party youth member was named after the founding father of the
PSOE, the equivalent of the British Labour Party’s Keir Hardie. It is therefore ironic that the PSOE appears to have
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most to fear from the emergence of Podemos, but, judging from the opprobrium heaped on the party over recent
weeks, consternation is felt across the political spectrum. ‘Weirdos’; ‘populists’’; ‘catastrophic, offering Hugo Chávez-
style utopias which would lead to unmitigated disaster’ are just some of the more choice examples directed at
Iglesias and Podemos. The insults have proved counterproductive, if anything providing a further fillip to the arriviste
as it goes from strength to strength.
Podemos was able to capitalise on Iglesias’s numerous television appearances, in which his articulate criticisms of
the austerity policies backed by Chancellor Merkel and the Troika resonated with a sympathetic – and substantial –
audience which agreed with the party’s key conclusion that the dominant political class is incapable of proposing an
economic strategy opposed to that imposed by the markets. Taking full advantage of the possibilities offered by
social media to get its message across, and therefore able to challenge the all-pervasive media presence of the
major parties, Podemos was equipped with the means of introducing itself to the electorate in a highly effective
manner. Moreover, it was able to attract sufficient financial backing via crowdfunding to secure the support of one-
and-a-quarter million voters.
Opinion polling carried out by Metroscopia for the centre-left newspaper El País indicates that around half of
Podemos voters are aged between 35 and 54, a similar proportion having backed either the PSOE or IU at the 2011
general election, with those under 35 accounting for 34 per cent of the vote. Over half of those voting for Podemos
nevertheless indicated that they would not rule out voting for the PSOE at the 2015 general election, despite the fact
that Iglesias has ruled out any possibility of a future alliance with the PSOE. Around half of Podemos voters were
employed, whilst around one-in-five was educated to university level. The party’s support base therefore hardly
consists of a majority of people experiencing an insecure situation within the labour market; much less are they
socially marginalised.
Those threatened with eviction from their properties due to the difficulty of keeping up mortgage payments,
collectives representing the unemployed and young people faced with seeking work abroad given the absence of
opportunities in Spain nevertheless continue to offer an obvious constituency for Podemos in the local, regional and
national elections due to be held during the course of 2015. Rejecting accusations that Podemos was little more
than a protest vote, Iglesias has on the contrary claimed that its aim was to work towards and derive benefit from the
decline of the PSOE and People’s Party (PP) and transform the party into a force capable of entering government.
The combined vote of the PSOE and PP constituted less than half of the overall vote (compared to 81 per cent in
2009), with both parties combined losing more than five million votes, indicating that the days of a two-party system
leaving little room for alternative parties may be numbered: eight smaller parties obtained representation in the
European Parliament in 2014 with 41 per cent of the vote compared to just four in 2009 with 14 per cent of the vote.
It remains to be seen, however, whether this shift is replicated at next year’s general election, although neither major
party has grounds for optimism. Indeed, the PSOE’s leader, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, immediately announced his
decision to step down once it became clear how poorly his party had performed, with his replacement due to be
elected in July. His resignation was a clear acknowledgement of the PSOE’s failure to mount an effective opposition
to the PP since its defeat at the 2011 general election.
As for Podemos, alliances with other political forces may prove a feasible option over the coming period. Given that
the Plural Left coalition could justifiably claim that it had done well at the European Parliamentary elections, trebling
its number of MEPS, some kind of an alliance with Podemos remains a possibility. Indeed, overtures were made to
Podemos in the immediate aftermath of the elections with a view to forming a ‘grand coalition’ capable of
representing the majority of society. The forum for deciding this and other questions will be a ‘grand citizens’
assembly’ to be held in the autumn, which can be viewed as the next essential step in deciding Podemos’s future
course.
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